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COMMODITY AGREEMENTS AND THE 
NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 
by Gordon W. Smith 
Support for fundamental changes in international commodity markets 
has swelled considerably since 1973. Among others, Prime Minister Harold 
Wilson, the European Economic Community, and the United Nations Con- 
ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) have advanced their 
general plans for reform, and the United States is expected to do so shortly.' 
Several factors explain this rather sudden about-face by many governments. 
First, there was the commodity boom and bust of 1972-1975. Raw materials 
prices soared to unprecedented heights and appeared to lead the double- 
digit inflation which plagued most industrial countries. Then many com- 
modity prices collapsed in late 1974 and 1975, leading to fears that future 
supplies would again be inadequate. Surely, many feel, something can be 
done to reduce such wild gyrations in prices (see figure I). 
Second, the so-called "Third World," strengthened by short-run com- 
modity shortages, began to push much harder in the United Nations and 
other organizations for a "New International Economic Order." The New 
Order proposals start from two assumptions. 1) The current international 
economic system is heavily biased against the less developed countries (LDCs) 
and tends to retard their development. 2) The rich nations of the world have 
a duty to make far greater sacrifices than hitherto in order to alleviate the 
plight of the poor nations. A brief (not inaccurate) summary of the policy 
conclusion drawn from these assumptions is that in all international eco- 
nomic dealings, preferential and non-reciprocal treatment should be given 
to LDCs. In the law of the sea, for example, this would mean that LDCs 
would be the primary beneficiaries of deep sea mining. In international 
finance, LDCs should be the main (initial) recipients of new special drawing 
rights, the International Monetary Fund's "paper gold." In international 
trade LDCs should be given special tariff preferences. Technology should be 
transfered to LDCs on very favorable terms; and in primary commodities, 
our main interest here, the New Order would mean much higher, more stable 
raw materials prices, indexed to the costs of LDC imports from the industrial 
countries.2 
Mr. Smith is Associate Professor of Econom~cs at Rice University. 
163 
RICE UNIVERSITY STUDIES 
Cornrnoditles 
---- Metals 
FIG 1 TIII Et  O \ O ! l l S l ' ~  i'Kl( L O t  K,Z\L h l A r t  KIA1 5 1969-1975 
COMMODITY AGREEMENTS AND THE NEW ECONOMIC ORDER 165 
In more "normal" times, the industrial nations probably would have 
listened politely to such demands and then ignored them as they had so 
often in the past;3 now the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) has successfully tied the discussion of oil to that of other raw 
materials. The industrial countries can no longer be sure that refusal to yield 
on the raw materials front will not lead to retaliatory actions in Hence, 
many consuming nations have become much more "forthcoming" in other 
commodities than they otherwise would have been. 
In addition, there has been much concern that producer cartels might 
form in commodities other than oil, and that OPEC money might be used 
to bolster their probability of success.5 This fear was intensified by a prolifer- 
ation of "producers associations" in raw materials ranging from iron ore, 
bauxite, and copper, down to tungsten. In most cases cartel-type action has 
not yet resulted from producer efforts, and calmer analysis since mid-1974 
has led most observers to discount considerably the probability of successful 
cartels in all but a few commodities. Still, the threat cannot be dismissed 
entirely and is one motive for the change of heart in some of the developed 
countries. 
Clearly the goals of the industrial nations in proposing new commodity 
arrangements are quite different from those of the LDCs. The industrial 
countries all want to avoid a repetition of the shortages of 1973. They want 
to  forestall the development of producer cartels, and they want to assure an 
abundant, secure, long-term supply of raw materials. Some of those con- 
cerned also hope that pressure by petroleum suppliers might be relaxed 
somewhat in exchange for concessions by the developed countries in regard 
to other raw materials. Finally, most DC governments are seeking political 
good will with the LDCs, which they hope will spill over to favorable treat- 
ment in areas other than commodities. 
The strong LDC demand for higher, and indexed, commodity prices, is 
unlikely to be accepted voluntarily by the industrial nations. The claim that 
raw material prices are "too low" goes at least as far back as Raul Prebisch's 
1949 thesis that there is a long-run tendency for the terms of trade-export 
priceslimport prices-to turn against raw materials exporters. Since there 
is no valid economic justification for the alleged tendency, Prebisch and his 
supporters in UNCTAD have concluded that it results from the exercise of 
some kind of "monopoly power" by the industrial countries. Accepting the 
premise, LDCs demand redress in the form of permanently higher prices. 
Statistical evidence has never been decisive in the debate about the terms 
of trade. Even after a group of experts, convened by UNCTAD itself in late 
April 1975, agreed unanimously that the pertinent statistics did not provide 
any clear evidence of a long term deterioration in the net barter terms of 
trade of developing nations, New Order advocates persist in their assertions. 
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In any case, Third World demands for permanently higher and indexed 
raw materials prices would require the end of international markets as they 
currently operate. Supplies would have to be lowered below market equi- 
librium levels, and mechanisms to guarantee the restriction would have to be 
created. Export or production quotas would be necessary in many countries, 
and cooperation of the importing nations would be required to prevent 
extensive cheating. The problem of quota allocation is extremely difficult. 
Usually quotas have been determined by past production or export per- 
formance.6 This procedure tends to freeze the pattern of production, and in 
the case of many minerals, where new discoveries are occurring constantly, 
quotas ultimately would generate gross distortions in the location of pro- 
duction. 
Indexation would compound the problem. Indexation links a price or 
another monetary value to some general index of prices, normally as an 
adjustment for inflation. Escalator clauses which tie wages to the cost of 
living index are probably the most common example, although some coun- 
tries also index the face value of government bonds and other financial 
assets. Rigid indexation of commodity prices, however, makes little economic 
sense. It  would lock in relative prices a t  levels which could rapidly become 
unsupportable without the kinds of controls discussed above. The resulting 
misallocation of resources could be serious, while the technical obstacles to 
calculating "appropriate" price indices for the indexation procedure are 
formidable indeed. 
For these "technical" reasons alone, there is very little chance that the 
industrial countries will agree to enforce higher than equilibrium prices in 
world raw materials markets. Nor, in spite of the rhetoric, is it clear that 
many LDCs realistically expect them to agree. 
This does not mean that nothing constructive can be done on the raw 
materials front. To the contrary, both groups of countries would seem to 
have a mutual interest in attacking the extreme price instability plaguing 
many of the industrial raw materials. For many LDCs, unstable commodity 
prices translate into very unstable and unpredictable export earnings, often 
upsetting all attempts at consistent and rational economic planning;' but 
the industria1 countries also lose from extreme price instability. Uncertain 
cash flows probably reduce the IeveI of investment and production in raw 
materials ventures. Furthermore, raw materials price swings tend to aggra- 
vate the underlying inflationary and recessionary forces in the industrial 
economies. This has been most apparent in the 1972-1975 period, when raw 
materials prices exploded in the face of fears that supplies were reaching the 
point of nonavailability (see figure 1). 
At this point, the perceptive reader may ask why there is a problem at all. 
Private market speculation should be able to take care of price instability, at 
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least to the extent that is socially desirable. The speculator could buy and 
store in times of low prices and sell in times of high prices. As long as the 
price rose over the holding period more than the speculator's interest, stor- 
age, and other costs, he could make a profit; and if the speculator could not 
show a profit, the degree of stabilization achieved would cost more than it 
was worth socially.* This line of reasoning has a certain appeal; but one 
thing is patently clear-private speculators have not in fact done a particu- 
larly good job in stabilizing the prices of industrial raw materials. 
The reasons seem fairly straightforward. Future expected prices can be 
estimated with some precision only over a short time. When predictions 
extend much beyond a year, forecasts become extremely precarious and will 
be heavily discounted. The fact that no futures or forward market contract 
in raw materials extends beyond eighteen months reflects the extreme un- 
certainties of the forecasts. Unfortunately, the price cycles in many com- 
modities are much longer than a year and a half-perhaps longer than ten 
years; and they tend to be irregular. (Consider the long price cycles for 
copper in figure 2, for example.) Private speculators facing the possibility of 
bankruptcy on the downside are not likely to be risk-neutral. They wilI 
require a very high risk premium for very risky speculation, i.e., for exactly 
the longer term speculation required for greater market stabilization. Private 
speculators must expect very large price increases to compensate for risk if 
they are to store in anticipation of sales several years hence. As a result, 
optimal speculation from the private point of view will still permit substantial 
fluctuations in prices. 
Furthermore, one can safely forecast that large shocks to these markets 
will occur: wars (Korea, Mideast, Vietnam, etc.), unusual inflation and reces- 
sion, associations like OPEC, etc, What cannot be forecast well in advance 
is the timing and severity of the shocks. Therefore, private speculators with 
their risk aversion and fear of downside bankruptcy will be unable in general 
to dampen price fluctuations from these sources to any appreciable degree. 
Indeed, speculators may temporarily aggravate the impact of the unexpected 
shock, as evidence on speculative price run-ups in 1973-74 suggests. 
Since unaided private speculation has not dealt and cannot be expected to 
deal effectively with longer-term price instability, several official sources 
have proposed producer-consumer commodity agreements to soIve the 
problem.9 The main tool of such agreements in minerals would be the 
"buffer stock." In essence, a buffer stock would act as a longer-run supple- 
ment to the private market forces of demand and supply. It would buy in 
periods of glut and sell when private market supplies are unable to prevent 
large price increases. In principle, a buffer stock need not alter longer-run 
price trends. Rather, its goal should be to reduce instability around longer- 
run equilibrium price trends. 
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FIG. 2. ANNUAL AVERAGE DOLLAR PRICE OF COPPER (per Ib.) on the London Metal Exchange 
Divided by the U.S. GNP Deflator (1924-1974). 
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Because they would be publicly financed, with the credit of governments 
their ultimate guarantee, buffer stocks need not fear bankruptcy nor need 
they be averse to risk. Thus they could take the longer view and commit 
more resources to inventories than could the unaided private sector. 10 
Unfortunately, an effective buffer stock has never been tried in primary 
commodities. It is true that the International Tin Agreement has relied on 
buffer stocks to a considerable extent, but their size has been so small as to 
preclude much stabilizing effect." While the idea of buffer stocks may 
sound attractive, we have little to go on in judging their practicaI feasibility. 
How large a stock would be required? How should it be operated? How 
should it fix the target price around which market prices will be stabilized? 
Would its benefits outweigh its costs? Some tentative answers to these 
questions emerge from a study on the desirability of copper buffer stocks.12 
Copper is one of the more likely candidates for a producer-consumer 
commodity agreement. It  vies with aluminum as the second most important 
metal in the world (by total value of production). Copper is also especially 
volatile in price (see figure 2). Macroeconomic instability in the industrial 
countries is the prime cause of copper price volatility. Copper is used mainly 
in the manufacture of electrical machinery and equipment-that is, invest- 
ment goods and consumer durables. Hence the demand for the metal rises 
and falls with the business cycle, but with considerably greater amplitude 
than the economy as a whole. Supply is fairly elastic with respect to price 
within the ''normal" range of output, but tends to increasing inelasticity as 
the extremes of capacity utilization are approached. Thus at least three 
times in the last twenty years (1954-55, 1964-65, 1973-74) capacity was 
strained during economic boom and prices skyrocketed; and three times in 
the ensuing economic recessions prices plummeted below costs. 
Supply disturbances have also occurred from time to time. The year 1973, 
for example, saw civil disturbances in both Chile and Zambia, large suppliers 
of copper. But as a rule supply shocks have been much less important to 
copper than to the principal agricultural products, for which weather is 
crucial. 
For the LDCs, copper exports are outdistanced only by export of petro- 
leum. Three countries-Chile, Zambia, and Zaire-depend on copper for 
well over two-thirds of their foreign exchange earnings (see table l) ,  and 
consequently have suffered great and chronic instability in their balance of 
payments. Almost half of world exports of copper, however, are accounted 
for by the developed countries, mainly Canada and Australia. 
The chief problem with copper for both users and producers is its price 
instability. Undoubtedly the best way to deal with the problem would be to 
eliminate its principal cause, the business cycle in the industrial countries. 
In lieu of this unlikely event, buffer stocks become the main instrument 
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which might dampen price volatility without raising prices over the long 
run. But could a copper buffer stock function effectively? In an attempt to 
answer this question, we ran simulations of the Charles River Associates- 
Wharton EFA econometric model of the world copper market, probably the 
best model of this metal. Our procedure was to introduce a hypothetical 
buffer stock into the copper market during the historical period 1955-1973. 
The simulations then determined the buffer stock's impact on prices, con- 
sumption, producer revenues, etc., and its cost of operation. 
Clearly, simulations of econometric models of the past give imperfect guid- 
ance for the future.13 Market structures will undoubtedly change and the 
patterns of future economic fluctuations and supply disturbances will not 
duplicate the past. Still, simulations do permit order of magnitude conclu- 
sions, and this is their only goal in the present context. 
Before we turn t o  the simulation results, some discussion of the principles 
of buffer stock operation is in order. A buffer stock can be described by its 
rules of buying and selling and the financial resources which are put at its 
disposal. These, in turn, are determined by the objectives which the buffer 
stock is designed to  achieve. For the present analysis the hypothetical copper 
buffer stock is designed to stabilize prices within certain bandwidths around 
long-run trend prices. The upper bound on desired prices is called the 
"ceiling" and the lower bound, the "floor." The long-run trend price is called 
the "target" price in this paper. The buffer stock sells out of its stock to keep 
the market price from penetrating the ceiling and buys for inventories when 
the market price would otherwise go through the floor. 
The bandwidth of permissible price fluctuations is very important in the 
operation of a buffer stock. A narrower band will bring greater price stability 
but will require more buffer stock intervention to defend the floor and 
ceiling. Very narrow bands also guarantee that the buffer stock will lose 
money, because the main source of net revenue from the operation is the 
difference between average buying and selling prices, which will be smaller 
the narrower the permissible bands of fluctuations. In general, the band 
should be wide enough to cover interest, storage, and transactions costs. In 
the simulations we used three alternative bandwidths: + 5% 7.5%, and 10% 
centered on target prices. 
The choice of each year's target price is critical. If the target is consistently 
set above long-term equilibrium values, the buffer stock will be a net pur- 
chaser of copper, will suffer large financial losses, and will distort resource 
allocation. On the other hand, target prices far below long-run trend values 
mean that the buffer stock will rarely purchase copper to defend the floor, 
and hence will have insufficient stocks to defend the ceiling. The buffer stock 
will make a profit, but will have minor impact in reducing price fluctuations. 
How should the target price be set? Preferably, at its "long-run trend" 
value according to the objectives of the buffer stock; but in practice this is an 
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ambiguous concept and one difficult to estimate. Five year lagged moving 
averages, adjusted annually, are one estimate of trend price which commends 
itself as a rule of thumb, mainly because of its simplicity and ease of applica- 
tion.14 We use it in the simulations, It ailows some accommodation to 
recent market forces, but greatly dilutes current events as indicators of 
longer-term trends. Steady upward or downward pressure would show up 
as steady upward or downward movements in the lagged moving average. 
Obviously, there are many other methods of estimating trend prices, and 
even the five-year length of the moving average is somewhat arbitrary. As 
will be seen below, however, this simple rule of thumb worked quite well in 
the simulations, so that there was no need to pursue more complicated 
approaches. 
Unfortunately, the five-year moving average rule could not be used in 
setting the initial (1955) target price for simulation. The five years prior to 
1955 included the commodity boom provoked by the Korean War scare. 
Average prices over the period 1950-1954 were far above long-run trend. 
We chose instead an initial target of 1967 $.45 per lb, of copper wirebar-a 
moderate support price fairly close to the full cost of production at that 
time. The weight given to market prices in calculating the target increased 
each year from 1956 to 1960, and by 196 1 the five-year lagged moving average 
rule was in full force. 
Finally, the question must be asked: which market price should be the 
target of the buffer stock operation? During the period simulated (1955- 
1973), the London Metals Exchange (LME) price of copper wirebar was the 
basis for transactions in all the world except the United States.Is Thus it 
was used as the basis for calculating the target. The pound price was con- 
verted into dollars at 1967 exchange rates and then deflated by the U.S. 
wholesale price index. This procedure in effect indexes the target price. Real 
price, rather than nominal price, is the target. 
To recapitulate, the buffer stock is simulated over the period 1955-1973. 
The operation buys and sells to maintain prices within three alternative 
bands +5%, 7.595, and 10% around target price, which in turn is calculated 
as the five-year moving average, lagged one year, of the real LME dollar 
price of copper. In order to determine the financial requirements of each 
rule, the buffer stock is assumed to have unlimited capital resources. 
A summary of the simulation results is presented in table 2 and figure 3. 
They show that relatively simple buffer stock ruIes could have brought 
dramatic reductions in price fluctuations during the simulation period 
without great social cost. True, the +5% band is much too narrow, and as a 
result loses $850 million (in 1967 prices). Discounted real buffer stock losses 
in the 10% simulation, however, were quite moderate, averaging $13 million 
per year over the 1955-1973 period. To give some idea of relative size, a .3% 
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TABLE 2 
SIMULATIONS OF THE IMPACT OF HYPOTHETICAL BUFFER STOCK 
to Maintain Price Within f5,7.5,10% 
Around 5-Year Lagged Moving Average, 1955-1 973 
Initial Price = 1967 $.45 /lb. 
Real LME Copper Price in $ 1  
Largest Percentage 
Annual Increase 
Largest Percentage 
Annual Decrease 
Average Annual 
Percentage Increase 
Average Annual 
Percentage Decrease 
Discounted Real Producer 
Revenue (billion 1967 $ ) 2  
Percent Revenue differs 
from no buffer stock 
act~vity simulation 
Discounted Real Buffer' 
Profit (million 1967 $) 
Maximum Stock Reached 
(th. s. t.) 
Maximum Investment in 
Stock (1967 $million) 
Average Investment (1967 $) 
Terminal Stock (th. s. t.) 
Notes: 
1. The LME price was converted to dollars and then deflated by the BLS Wholesale Price 
Index. 
2. 2% real discount rate, 1% ad valorem transactions costs and .65% ad valorem annual 
storage costs were assumed. 
3. (Sales minus purchases minus storage and transactions costs), all In 1967 $ and discounted 
back to 1955, the beginning year of the buffer stock. 
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tax on the discounted value of world copper sales would have sufficed to 
pay for losses under the 10% rule. Work not yet completed suggests that a 
+15% rule would actually have made a profit, but at the cost of greater price 
instability. 
The simulations give considerable support to those who argue that a 
long-term copper agreement to stabilize prices within some band (something 
like +lo% seems most reasonable) around price trends would bring substan- 
tial improvement in the operation of the copper market at very little cost. 
It would have to  be understood from the beginning that price stabilization, 
not artificial increases in long-run copper prices, would be the goal of the 
agreement. Production and export controls would not be permitted in the 
agreement. The initial target price should be set as closely as possible to 
long-run equilibrium prices.16 Then some mechanical rule, such as the 
"crawling peg" (five year moving average) used in the simulation, should be 
used to adjust target prices annually. 
The main, and probably decisive, factors militating against such an agree- 
ment are the size of the financial commitment and the patience that would 
be required of the parties to the pact. In the simulations, a total investment 
on the order of $3 billion (in 1967 prices) was tied up in copper stocks for 
several years running. At its maximum, the buffer stock held in storage 
sufficient copper to satisfy all demands (except from communist countries) 
for the metal for a t  least eight months, This amount is much larger than the 
figures mentioned by the proponents of a copper agreement, and it would be 
extremely difficult to negotiate an agreement of such magnitude. 
In the simulations, the first sale from stock took place only in 1965, in the 
eleventh year of the agreement. Until that time, all operations had been in 
support of the copper price floor. Surely by that time the consumer member 
nations would have begun to suspect that the agreement was stacked in 
favor of copper producers. Probably the consumer nations would have 
forced large reductions in the target price, which would have reduced the 
effectiveness of the agreement over the long run,l7 or perhaps the agreement 
would have collapsed. Other work which has been done with tin, lead, and 
zinc led to qualitatively similar conclusions to those reported for the copper 
in this paper. 18 
In a sense, the conclusions of the analysis are both optimistic and pessi- 
mistic. There does appear to be real foundation to  the notion that both 
consumers and producers-both industrial and less developed countries- 
could benefit from the right type of commodity agreement, but the "right" 
type requires all sides to be far more forthcoming in financial resources than 
they are likely to be. "Fa~ade" agreements, such as those we have had in tin 
and coffee, are thus likely to be the result. The ineffectiveness of f a ~ a d e  
agreements would soon be exposed by market forces, probably amidst bitter 
recriminations from all sides. 
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